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COMBATING CORRUPTION AS A POLITICAL STRATEGY TO
REBUILD TRUST AND LEGITIMACY: CAN CHINA LEARN FROM
HONG KONG?
Anthony B. L. Cheung
ABSTRACT
Despite an intensified anticorruption campaign, China's economic growth and social
transition continue to breed loopholes and opportunities for big corruption, leading to a
money-oriented mentality and the collapse of ethical standards, and exposing the
communist regime to greater risk of losing moral credibility and political trust. In Hong
Kong, the setting up of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974
marked the advent of a new comprehensive strategy to eradicate corruption and to rebuild
trust in government. ICAC was not just an anti-corruption enforcement agency per se, but
an institution spearheading and representing integrity and governance transformation.
This article considers how mainland China can learn from Hong Kong's experience and
use the fight against corruption as a major political strategy to win the hearts and minds of
the population and reform governance in the absence of more fundamental constitutional
reforms, in a situation similar to Hong Kong's colonial administration of the 1970s-80s
deploying administrative means to minimize a political crisis.
INTRODUCTION
The year 2006 sounded a great alarm to corrupt officials in China. Former Communist
Party Politiburo member and party chief of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, was removed from
office and investigated in connection with a RMB3 billion (approx. US$395 million) social
security fund corruption scam. Other top officials charged with corruption included Qiu
Xiaohua, former chief of the National Bureau of Statistics, and Zheng Xiaoyu, former Vice
Director  of  the  State  Administration  of  Food and  Drug;  the  latter  was  even  given  a  death
sentence. By now there is no doubt that China’s fourth-generation leadership under
President Hu Jiantao and Premier Wen Jiabao has embarked on a new high-profile
campaign against corruption in pursuit of the construction of a harmonious society.
This is not the first time that China has engaged in a conspicuous exercise to fight
corruption. Indeed, as academic research (e.g. Wedeman, 2005) puts it, China has depended
largely on a strategy of ‘enforcement swamping’ or campaign-style enforcement, using
periodic intensive anti-corruption campaigns and intensive crackdowns, so as to create a
deterrence effect. Such strategy might result in some concurrent decrease in petty
corruption but ironically there has been observable increase in more serious corruption
cases involving huge sums of money and more senior and top officials. It is argued that this
strategy aims at controlling corruption rather than eradicating it as the costs of eradication
are too high and there lacks the political will and enforcement capacity for vigorous
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eradication (Wedeman, 2005). As the anti-corruption campaign intensifies and as China’s
economic growth and social transition breed loopholes and opportunities for big corruption
(e.g. bank loans, financial deals and land clearance and development), leading to a money-
oriented mentality and the collapse of ethical standards, the present communist regime is in
the risk of losing its moral credibility and political trust.
Colonial Hong Kong by the early 1970s also faced the same moral and legitimacy crisis
caused by extensive corruption. However, three decades later, Hong Kong now stands far
ahead of the rest of China in the eyes of the international community (see Table 1).
Table 1. Hong Kong and China according to Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 2001-
2006






































Source: Transparency International (2007).
Most analysts would attribute Hong Kong’s achievement to the setting up of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, which marked the advent of
a new comprehensive strategy to eradicate corruption and at the same time rebuild trust in a
government that suffered from an inherent legitimacy deficit because of its colonial and
undemocratic nature. The ICAC was not just an anti-corruption enforcement agency per se,
but an institution spearheading and representing integrity and governance transformation.
This article considers how mainland China can learn from Hong Kong’s ICAC experience
and use the fight against corruption as a major political strategy to win the hearts and minds
of the population and reform governance in the absence of more fundamental constitutional
reforms, in a situation similar to Hong Kong’s colonial administration of the 1970s-80s
deploying administrative means to minimize a political crisis.
HONG KONG’S ANTI-CORRUPTION EXPERIENCE
The establishment of the high-powered ICAC in Hong Kong in 1974 by the colonial
governor Murray MacLehose had proved to be greatly successful in breaking up corruption
syndicates within government departments and in detecting corrupt practices in both the
public and private sectors. In the words of MacLehose himself, the ICAC “has changed
much in Hong Kong that many regarded as unchangeable” (quoted in King, 1980, 115).
Indeed, this very indigenous setup had in no insignificant degree created a new phase of
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political development in Hong Kong and was credited as a kind of ‘charismatic institution’,
with immense symbolic and organizational capabilities and being able to command a high
degree of public commitment which in turn provided it with some of its own institutional
resources (King, 1980, 115).
The ICAC was an outcome of both evolution and revolution. It was not a sudden product.
As Kuan (1981) pointed out, the formation of the ICAC came after over 20 years of
government efforts to develop stricter and more severe legal measures against corruption.
The first proper anti-corruption legislation passed in Hong Kong was the 1948 Prevention
of Corruption Ordinance which was based on an equivalent law in Britain. An Anti-
Corruption  Branch  was  set  up  in  the  Police  Force.  From  1956  a  Standing  Committee  on
Corruption was established to advise the government on anti-corruption measures. This
Committee was reorganized in 1961 to include an unofficial member each from the
Legislative and Executive Councils in response to public pressure for an independent
commission of enquiry. The first local legislation on corruption, the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance,  was  enacted  in  1971.  In  1973,  because  of  the  unexplained  escape  from  Hong
Kong of a corruption suspect, Chief Police Superintendent Peter Godber, there were mass
demonstrations and calls for quick and tough action by the government whose legitimacy
had now suffered further erosion. As King remarked, the government was defenceless in
the face of the public outcry over the Godber escape and “to say that there was an authority
crisis is no exaggeration” (King, 1980, 117). The then newly-arrived reform-minded
governor was thus able to seize upon the opportunity to appoint a Commission of Inquiry
under Justice Alastair Blair-Kerr in 1973, who eventually recommended the setting up of an
independent commission against corruption answerable directly to the governor.
MacLehose was determined “to represent the cause of the people” and through the ICAC to
launch  a  ‘silent  revolution’  to  provide  Hong  Kong  with  “a  clean  society  and  a  clean
government” (Kuan, 1981, 41).
However, as Lee observed, the change in social awareness suggested that corruption as a
social problem had “both an objective and a subjective aspect” (Lee, 1981, 6). Corrupt
activities were widespread (objective aspect) in Hong Kong for more than a century, but
corruption only came to be recognized (subjective aspect) as a serious problem within the
1970s, particularly following the establishment of the ICAC1. That the colonial government
was prepared to target corruption for major reform in the 1970s but not previously, needs to
be explained by the post-1967 change in the government’s political agenda2, particularly
after MacLehose’s arrival, manipulating the ‘political opportunity’ created by the Godber
crisis  to  re-establish  the  legitimacy  of  the  government.  The  ICAC  was  in  effect  an
1 This is somewhat similar to the conceptual distinction made between ‘condition’ and ‘problem’ in agenda
setting by Kingdon (1984). Condition is an objective situation while ‘problem’ is how the policy-makers
define the condition for subsequent action.
2  The Chinese communist-inspired riots against the British colonial administration exposed serious gaps
between the  ruling  elites  and the  masses,  and a  crisis  of  legitimacy of  colonial  rule.  In  the  aftermath  of  the
riots, the government began to embark on major administrative reforms in order to modernize the civil service
and to build links between government and people through the City District Officer scheme (see King, 1981;
Cheung, 1999)
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administrative response to a more fundamental political problem facing British colonial
governance in Hong Kong at the time:
“Many thought that government was run only in the interests of those who held
office. More believed that officials and the police, in particular, were corrupt and
that it was necessary to pay bribes to obtain services. … For a government anxious
to establish its legitimacy on a basis of positive support, it was clearly important
that it should be seen to be strongly opposed to graft. When the opportunity arose to
demonstrate government’s commitment to the prevention of corruption,
MacLehose was quick to seize it” (Scott, 1989, 146).
In this respect, as Scott analyzed, colonial governments faced constant, if often latent,
challenges to their legitimacy – “a regime established and ultimately reliant on force cannot
easily win the consent of the governed” (Scott, 1989, 322).  Legitimacy is not just about
strength  and  the  capacity  to  govern.  It  is  also  about  the  moral  basis  of  the  government’s
authority. In the case of colonial Hong Kong, the government’s justification of its right to
rule rested mainly on five contingent factors:
? Its record of past performance-proven capacity in delivering public goods, i.e. its
administrative efficiency;
? The right to rule as legitimized by epistemocratic authority, i.e. its claims to
specialized knowledge and wisdom (bureaucratic paternalism);
? Its  ability  to  maintain  its  position  by  interpreting  what  it  said  was  the  consensus,
through a rationalization process of ‘consultation and consent’ (the advisory system);
? The ‘sheer habituation’ or apathy of the population, i.e. the people’s acquiescence
of the status quo; and
? Economic prosperity as an important support for legitimacy.
Against this backdrop, the problems created by widespread corruption to the government’s
legitimacy were two-fold. Corruption had become dysfunctional to both economic
development and the modernization of government administrative capacity, which were
crucial to improving its performance on the legitimacy front. By grasping an anti-
corruption agenda, the reformist colonial administration under MacLehose was able to
demonstrate its epistemocratic authority and consensus-interpretation capacity (Scott, 1989,
323-24) by way of a major strategic response to a crisis considered no longer tolerable by
all quarters of society. Doing something about what everybody wanted to be eradicated,
and doing it right the first time, was a sure way of winning support and legitimacy. As the
ICAC scheme subsequently showed, the innovative way of combating corruption through a
high-powered agency was able to underscore both the moral determination  as  well  as  the
organizational effectiveness of the new administration to finally do something about
corruption. The worth of government was thus proven.
Since its inception in 1974, ICAC has adopted a comprehensive and all-embracing strategy
(the three-pronged approach emphasizing enforcement, prevention and community
education). Unlike anti-corruption reforms elsewhere, the building blocks of such a strategy
were based on the realization that corruption involved complex interactions between state
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and society; that cultural values played a major role in defining the operational and
practical meanings of corruption; and that legal reforms, if they were to be effective, had to
be closely linked to those values (Lo, 2001, 25). ICAC was indeed given wide-ranging
powers to investigate government and business dealings, some of which would be
politically impossible in other countries and even deemed draconian by current-day Hong
Kong standards. In addition to the ICAC, the colonial administration had also embarked on
extensive measures of civil service modernization and public sector reform in the final
decades of colonial rule (Cheung, 1999; 2006).
By  now  the  ICAC  is  one  of  the  largest  anti-corruption  agencies  in  the  world  and  a  role
model emulated by other countries (notably Australia and South Korea). According to its
2006 commissioned survey (ICAC, 2007), 65.4% considered corruption uncommon, and
82.2% expected less corruption or a steady corruption situation in the coming year.  On a 0-
10 point scale (0 representing total rejection and 10 total tolerance), the mean scores for
public  tolerance  of  corruption  in  the  civil  service  and  the  business  sector  were  extremely
low, at 1.1 and 1.8 respectively. The ICAC has also become one of the post-1997 icons of
Hong Kong, to mark the city’s difference from mainland China under the ‘one country two
systems’ framework; hence official publicity has emphasized that “Hong Kong has the
ICAC!”  Looking back, it is clear that Hong Kong’s anti-corruption efforts have worked not
only  because  of  ICAC’s  three-pronged  strategy,  but  also  due  to  the  presence  of  a  strong
political will on the part of government, as sustained by an equally strong public consensus,
to make Hong Kong a clean society.
CORRUPTION IN CHINA: FEATURE AND CAUSES
In China, corruption is usually described as the using of public authority (and public
resources) for private interests (and purposes) (‘yiquan musi’). According to Articles 382 to
396 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), corruption crimes occur
when any state functionary, by taking advantage of his office, appropriates, steals, swindles
public money or property or by other means illegally takes it into his own possession;
extorts money or property from another person, or illegally accepts another person’s money
or property in return for securing benefits for the person; for the purpose of securing
illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to a state functionary, or introduces a bribe to
a state functionary; misappropriates public funds for his own use or for conducting illegal
activities or for profit-making activities; divides up state-owned assets in secret, and so on.
Both Heidenheimer (1989) and White (1996) suggested a three-class categorization of
corruption in China. In a gist, public office-centred corruption includes graft, bribe, fraud,
embezzlement, extortion, smuggling, tax evasion etc., which may be regarded as economic
crimes. Market-centred corruption includes ‘unhealthy practices’ like extravagance and
waste, and spending public money to support luxurious work conditions and/or life style of
senior officials; as well as ‘institutional corruption’ whereby officials of public institutions
use their institutional power to increase the revenue of their institutions and improve the
welfare of their staff through various legal, semi-legal and illegal means, including
engaging in business activities and imposing fines or collecting all sorts of administrative
International Public Management Review  ?  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net
Volume 8 Issue 2  ?  2007  ?  © International Public Management Network
50
fees and so-called service charges (which Chinese critics called ‘guan tao’ during the late
1980s to early 1990s). Public-interest-centred corruption refers to those practices
constituting a kind of ‘common practice’ of social life, including all forms of nepotism and
favouritism, often alluded to as the relationship networks (or ‘quanzi’).
Despite rapid economic development and growing affluence, mainland China has scored
poorly in Transparency International’s corruption perception index (Table  1). Corruption
problems are perceived to be particularly acute in the real estate and banking sectors
(Political & Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd., 2007, 7). What makes matters worse is that
“the local judicial system has a poor record of prosecuting corruption and judges and police
are frequently seen as being more a part of the problem than the solution” (ibid). According
to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Ye, 2006)3, corruption crimes nowadays display the
following characteristics:
? Corruption crime cases have become more numerous, of which the proportion of the
major and important cases is high. In 2005 alone, some 41,500 state functionaries
were investigated for involvement in bribery, embezzlement and malfeasance crime
cases, of which some 8,500 involved accepting bribes of RMB100,000 and above,
or misappropriations of pubic funds of RMB1 million and above. Among the
culprits, about 2,800 were at county/division head level and above, of whom 196
were at departmental head level in provincial and central governments and eight
were at provincial leadership or ministerial level.
? Corruption crimes spread along with the development and transformation of the
economy. In the early 1980s, officials took advantage of the loopholes resulting
from prices differentials existing in the ‘double track system’ as the planned
economy transited towards a market economy system. In the mid- to late-1980s,
corruption crimes and embezzlement cases arose in the communication and
transportation fields which were the ‘bottlenecks’ of economic reform. From the
1990s onwards, corruption crimes spread to the financial system, particularly in the
approval of bank loans. As more construction projects of highways were launched,
bribery and embezzlement crimes involving transport bureaus became common.
? Corruption crimes frequently involve collusion among several or even tens or
hundreds of suspected officials in a cluster of related cases. In certain local
governments, it was estimated that collusion cases took up over 30% of the total
caseload.
? There seems a trend of ‘corruption succession’ among different holders of the same
position, so that even after the predecessor was punished for corruption crime, the
successor fell into the same path of corruption, in what is described in Chinese as
the phenomenon of “goes the former, follows the latter” (qianpu houji).
3 Ye Fe was the Director General of the International Judicial Cooperation Department, Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, PRC.
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? Corruption crimes often involve the whole family, where two or more members of a
family collectively engage in bribery and corruption, such as collusion between
husband and wife, parents and children, and in-laws.
? Trading in official positions is becoming rampant. Owing to the lack of
transparency in the cadre personnel system, some officials either take advantage of
their authority over the transfer, appointment and removal of cadres to amass a
fortune, or become the target of bribery by those pursuing official positions illegally
in order to seek access to power and privileges.
China’s fight against corruption has taken several twists and turns over the past half-
century. Each period represents a different interpretation of the problems of corruption,
resulting in the state’s particular strategic response to them.
Maoist period: Combating corruption as bureaucratic failure
In the early years of the PRC following the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), corruption was seen as a result of either the moral/ideological breakdown of cadres
or their behaviours of bureaucratism. In spite of the relatively puritan features of early PRC
rule, where cadres as revolutionary vanguards and champions of the mass line (“from the
masses, to the masses”), were expected to live a simple life and not to become parasites of
the masses, abuse of power and economic crimes were recognized quite early on as the new
social ills of the young revolutionary regime; hence the san-fan (‘three anti’) and wu-fan
(‘five anti’) campaigns in the early to mid 1950s against economic crimes and waste as the
country went through the initial stage of economic reconstruction and socialist
transformation. Until the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s, such social ills
were regarded as the problems of bureaucratic failure, not the nature of the socialist
economy and society which was deemed superior to capitalism, nor the nature of the
communist political order of one-party dictatorship which was portrayed as even more
democratic and accountable to the masses than Western-style liberal democracy.
Bureaucratic failure and bureaucratism were blamed on the lack of revolutionary fervour
and of a proper state of thought (the correct ideological and political lines) on the part of
the cadres. Problems were perceived within the context of ethical norms and ideological
correctness rather than in terms of legal and structural inadequacies. Maoist prescriptions to
bureaucratic problems took the forms of re-education, rectification and purges, aiming at
reinstituting a correct socialist moral and ideological frame (like the mass line, and the
campaign  to  learn  from  Lei  Feng4)  that  could  contain  and  minimize  the  abuse  of  cadre
power and deviant behaviours. In a totalist one-party state which centralized all powers and
functions – political, economic, social and cultural, it was understandable that any defects
in its cadre bureaucracy were bound to cause great ramifications across various spheres. In
the same vein, all political, economic and social problems were easily reduced to being
problems of bureaucratic failure. Harding (1981) identified three broad approaches used by
the CCP to deal with the problem of bureaucracy including corruption:
4 Lei Feng, a young soldier, was claimed to have died heroically in order to save the lives of his comrades.
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? Rationalization: seeking to perfect the bureaucracy (on the assumption that
problems arise if the system departs from the bureaucratic ideal);
? External remedialism: subjecting the bureaucracy to effective outside (external)
supervision and control, including the masses; and
? Internal remedialism: introducing non-bureaucratic elements into the bureaucracy to
alleviate problems arising from bureaucratic organization.
In the 1950s, a system of formal networks of cadre control was instituted similar to that in
the Soviet Union - with a state Procuratorate; a Ministry of Supervision and its network of
local supervisory offices to investigate cases of administrative malfeasance; and the party’s
Central Control Commission and local control commissions to control party members.
Redefined procedures, standards and rules were promulgated for the management of cadres.
There was initially reduced reliance on mass campaigns as a method for implementing
policy  as  higher  priority  was  given  to regularized bureaucratic practice rather than mass
mobilization. However, when more institutional means of perfecting and disciplining the
bureaucracy failed to achieve results, more radical and non-institutional means were
resorted to, such as open-door rectification in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the
radical revolutionary style of mass campaigns and purges witnessed during the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76) (the period of Radicalism in Harding’s words).
Reform period: Corruption as bureaucratic-cum-economic rent-seeking
The Cultural Revolution had much weakened the CCP both ideologically and politically,
resulting in what were characterized by intellectuals as the ‘three confidence crises’
(sanxin weiji) – lack of trust in the party, lack of confidence in the future, and lack of faith
in the Communist ideology. There was widespread distrust of open door rectifications and
campaigns and the radical approach was discarded when the old guards led by Deng
Xiaoping and Chen Yun returned to power in the late 1970s. External remedial measures
were restored to enforce a better regulated cadre system, notably through the introduction
of new laws and regulations, re-establishment of the Ministry of Supervision in the
government system, a re-styled and strengthened Central Commission on Disciplinary
Inspection (CCDI) in the party system, and various personnel management reform
measures.
During the socialist era of state planning and control, the state bureaucracy centralized all
economic resources and surpluses of society and the decisions on their distribution and use
under what was sometimes described as ‘an economy based on positions’ (zhiquan jingji),
giving rise to bureaucratic rent-seeking behaviours rooted in interdependency relationships
among cadres. The advent of economic reform and opening-up after the Cultural
Revolution, culminating in the introduction of a full-fledged market economy in the 1990s,
should have in theory ended the previous ‘positions economy’. However, the new but
under-institutionalized market nurtured by a state which still exercised immense
administrative power had led to the rise and rapid spread of various bureaucratic-cum-
economic rent-seeking activities. Instead of terminating the old vicious cycle, new
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opportunities were opened up to corruption which was brought to record highs. By 1995,
some Chinese observers maintained that there were “no officials who were not corrupt”
(White, 1996, 151). Corruption had so permeated various sectors of society that the
phenomenon was described as ‘whole people corruption’, satirically paraphrasing the
official term of ‘whole people’ ownership [meaning state ownership] of the economy in the
Maoist past (ibid). According to He Zengke (2000), there were some common explanations
of such rise of corruption in Reform China:
1. The co-existence of dual economic systems (i.e. a state-planned sector and a market-
commodity sector) during the whole transition period provided plenty of incentives and
opportunities for corrupt practices.
2. The breakdown of the prior distribution of national income among different social strata
(i.e. the relative reduction of officials’ income) drove government officials and public
institutions to seek extra income to supplement their own or their staff’s relatively low
and fixed official salaries.
3. The loopholes in, and weakness of, regulatory policies and institutions, certain policy
failures, and a lack of experience and technology in the anti-corruption agencies
tackling the new forms of corruption, all contributed to the growth of corruption.
4. The incompleteness of political reform and the weakness of the current political system
undermined anti-corruption efforts which, in turn, promoted the further proliferation of
corruption.
5. The decline in the moral costs of corruption had stimulated its further spread.
6. Certain traditional factors (such as the feudal and absolutist traditions) and international
factors (such as the impact of globalization) also contributed to the growth of corruption.
THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN CHINA
Over the past three decades of reforms, combating corruption was without exception put at
the forefront of the CCP’s political agenda each time a new leadership came to power.
According to Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe (2005, 537), two major anti-corruption campaigns
were launched in late 1978 (when Deng Xiaoping replaced Mao’s designated successor
Hua Guofeng as the new strongman of the party) and 1989 (following the Tiananmen
crackdown on the pro-democracy movement) respectively. On both occasions, the CCP
was deemed at the verge of organizational breakdown and embroiled in a serious
legitimacy crisis.
Rehabilitation of party and state control mechanisms after Cultural Revolution
At the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee held in December 1978, the CCDI
was established to enforce strict discipline in a party which had been torn apart by a decade
of rebellion, purges, unruliness and anarchism during the Cultural Revolution. The people’s
procuratorate and people’s courts systems were also revived. The National People’s
Congress returned to normal functioning after a new state constitution was promulgated in
December 1982. This represented a strategy of returning to the rational-bureaucratic
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approach of the 1950s. In 1982, as economic reform unfolded, Deng warned his fellow
comrades at the Central Committee Politburo meeting:
“Since our implementation of the twin policies of opening up externally and
reinvigorating our economy internally, it has taken no more than one to two years’
time to see quite many of our cadres becoming corrupted. Those involved in
economic criminal activities are by no means small in number; they constitute a
large  number.   …  This  wave  is  coming  hard  on  us.  If  our  party  does  not  take  it
seriously, to stop it resolutely, our party and country would truly encounter the
question of whether they would ‘change face’. This is not an exaggerating
warning” (Deng, 1994, 402-03).
Between 1979 and 1989, 23 pieces of rules and decisions on combating corruption were
made (Hu and Hu, 2005, 537).
In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, despite political setback, Deng insisted on
continuing economic reform but urged the new leadership headed by Jiang Zemin to take
strong actions to control and penalize corrupt activities, particularly at the senior levels, in
order to restore people’s confidence in the party. After all, corruption by public institutions
and officials (quan tao) was a key cause of student resentment that led to the protests and
hunger strike at Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989. Soon after becoming party
General Secretary, Jiang told a national conference of chiefs of organization department in
August 1989,
“The spread of corruption has seriously damaged the relations between the party
and the masses, and become the excuse for our enemies inside and outside the
country to subvert us. The struggle against corruption is crucial to the life and death
of the party”. (Selected Important Documents since the Thirteenth Party Congress,
1991, 580)
From 1989 to 2001, another 32 pieces of anti-corruption rules and decisions were made (Hu
and Hu, 2005, 537). Despite these exhortations, corruption as a political disease and social
illness continued to escalate in scale and degree, causing rising public concern. For
example, a 1996 survey found that Chinese workers ranked corruption as the social
problem that concerned them the most, above problems like wage reform, inflation, and law
and order5. Surveys by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2001 found that the
urban and rural respondents named corruption the top and second top factors affecting
social stability respectively (cited in Hu and Hu, 2005, 542, Table 2)6.  Middle to senior
party and state cadres (district/department level and above) polled also pointed to
corruption as the most serious problem (Hu and Hu, 2005, 544, Table 4).
5  Survey  conducted  by  the  Institute  of  Opinion  Research  of  the  People’s  University  of  China,  June  1996
(cited in Hsu, 2001).
6 In the rural survey, financial burden on peasants was named the top one factor affecting social stability. This
referred to all kinds of fees and charges levied by local officials on the peasants, again a symptom of
bureaucratic corruption and abuse of power.
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Under the current Hu-Wen leadership
Three decades of economic reform have enabled China to experience a boom not seen
before in the contemporary period. There is much talk of the new rise of China in the 21st
century. However, as the new leadership of President and party General Secretary Hu
Jiantao and Premier Wen Jiaao took over power at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, it had
obviously felt the mounting pressure to upscale efforts to control corruption. The growing
discontent by the general public (especially from a better educated and informed younger
generation) towards worsening corruption and abuse of power by officials, amidst widening
gaps in income and welfare in society, would make people lose faith not only in the party,
but also in the present economic marketization and reform policies which are perceived to
have  allowed corruption  to  proliferate.  It  is  also  threatening  social  stability  and  cohesion,
contrary to the kind of ‘harmonious society’ that the Hu-Wen leadership seeks to build to
mark the new approach of people-based governance7.
Enforcement actions have been intensified. At the 3rd session of the 10th National People’s
Congress (NPC) in March 2006, the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, Jia Chunwang reported that 2,960 officials at or above county level were
investigated  for  corruption  charges  –  among  whom  eleven  officials  were  at  provincial  or
ministerial level (People’s Daily Online, 9 March 2005). Prominent senior officials
convicted included former Minister for Land and Resources Tian Fengshan, former
Guizhou provincial party secretary Liu Fangren, and former Hubei provincial party deputy
secretary and governor Zhang Guoguang, who were given sentences ranging from eleven to
twelve years to life imprisonment (ibid). According to the Chief Justice Xiao Yang,
president of the Supreme People’s Court, in a separate report to NPC, the court system
penalized 772 corrupt officials and dealt with 24,148 cases involving graft, bribe-taking and
other corrupt activities in 2004 (ibid). In 2004, the party’s CCDI handled a caseload of
166,705 crimes and punished 170,850 party members found to have misbehaved, including
16 provincial/ministerial officials and 432 at or above prefecture level, according to a
meeting on clean government held in February 2005 (ibid). What was disturbing was that a
total of 345 procurators, 411 judges and 681 revenue collectors were also punished for graft
charges in 2004 (ibid). Corruption figures had not subsided in 2005.  Jia Chunwang told the
4th session  of  the  10th National  People’s  Congress  held  in  March  2006,  that  of  a  total  of
41,447 government officials probed for corruption and dereliction of duty, 30,205 were
brought to court (The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China website, 11
March 2006). At total of 2,799 officials above the county level - including 196 at prefecture
and eight at provincial and ministerial levels - were investigated. In addition, 9,117
executives of state-owned companies were probed for misappropriating or embezzling
company assets (ibid).
7  The goal of “building a socialist harmonious society” was first put forward at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th
Central Committee in September 2004. Accordingly, a harmonious society “should feature democracy, the
rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality. Such a society will give full scope to people’s talent
and creativity, enable all the people to share the social wealth brought by reform and development, and forge
an ever closer relationship between the people and government” (Xinhua News Agency, 27 June 2005).
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Under the new leadership, various policy statements, rules and legislations were introduced
aimed  at  curbing  corruption  and  malpractices.  At  the  Fourth  Plenum  of  the  16th  CCP
Central Committee held in September 2004, a core document titled Implementation Outline
for Building and Improving the System to Punish and Prevent Corruption (hereinafter
‘Implementation Outline’) was considered, and subsequently promulgated in January 2005
(Xinhua Net, 16 January 2005), which advocated a three-pronged approach with equal
emphasis on education (as fundamental), institution-building (as guarantee) and supervision
and monitoring (as the key) to combat and prevent corruption. A holistic approach to deal
with the roots and sources of corruption in addition to the symptoms and crimes was
promised. The document also highlighted the needs of strict enforcement against any
breaches of the law, especially in the major cases. Primary targets were the abuse of power
and misappropriations in central organs and among senior cadres. It was aimed that the
basic framework of an anti-corruption system covering both punishment and prevention be
put in place by 2010. The goal is to ultimately establish an effective long-term ideological
and ethical mechanism, an institutionalized anti-corruption system, and a monitoring
system of the exercise of power.
Since 2005, some 26 new rules, administrative measures and decisions directly or indirectly
related to corruption control were made, notably: the Party Regulations on Intra-Party
Monitoring and Supervision (25 August 2005); Provisions on the Responsibility System of
Building a Fine Party Style of Work and a Clean and Honest Government (16 January
2005); Provisional Guiding Principles for Honest and Clean Government by Party
Members as Leading Cadres (16 January 2005); and Provisional Rules Requiring Party
Members as Leading Cadres to Report on Work and Anti-Corruption Performance (26
February 2006). Various rules, notices and opinions have also been issued to curb the
involvement of government and party officials in commercial activities. In October 2005,
the Standing Committee of the NPC approved China’s access to the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. In September 2006, the Chinese government promulgated
the Declaration of Honest Government in China’s Public Security, requiring all police
officers to take an oath of conduct, undertaking, inter alia, to lead an honest life while
serving the public.
Besides anti-corruption measures and enforcement, Hu Jintao also launched a spiritual
rejuvenation campaign known as the ‘Eight Honours and Eight Disgraces’ (barong bachi)
Campaign in March 20068. A ‘Clean Government Channel’ specializing in anti-corruption
news and information is set up at Xinhua News Net. In March 2007, the establishment of a
new National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) was approved, with ministerial status
8  The eight ‘honours’ and eight ‘disgraces’ are presented as follows: “Love the mother country is honourable,
harming the mother country is disgraceful; serving the people is honourable, neglecting the people is
disgraceful; upholding science is honourable, blindness and ignorance are disgraceful; hard work is
honourable, idleness is disgraceful; unity and cooperation are honourable, using others for profit is disgraceful;
honesty and keeping one’s word are honourable, seeing personal gain and forgetting justice is disgraceful;
respecting laws and regulations is honourable, disobeying laws and regulations is disgraceful; suffering for
the struggle is honourable, conceit and lasciviousness are disgraceful” (as translated by The University of
Hong Kong China Media Project, 2007).
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directly under the State Council and given a wider range of anti-corruption responsibilities
including cadre education, institution building and international cooperation (Wen Wei Po,
21 March 2007). The new Bureau, to be headed concurrently by the Minister of
Supervision, will deal with corruption problems at their roots and work hand in hand with
CCDI, the Ministry of Supervision and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
ANALYZING CHINA’S CORRUPTION CONTROL STRATEGY: CONSTRAINTS
AND CHANGES
Despite the enhanced importance attached to fighting corruption by the top leadership, and
several decades of anti-corruption drives from the Maoist era of ideological campaigns to
the current period of using law enforcement and disciplinary inspection, corruption
continues to flourish. China’s corruption control efforts are often frustrated by its
enforcement constraints and caught in a dilemma in conceptualizing the politics of
corruption. Nevertheless, there are signs of changes in the most recent years.
Enforcement problems: From campaign enforcement to institutionalization
As Wedeman described vividly,
“the  repeated  ebb  and  flow  of  China’s  war  against  corruption  have  …  left  many
with the strong impression that anticorruption campaigns are a form of Beijing
Opera  in  which  the  actors  rush  about  the  stage  amid  great  sound  and  fury  in  a
drama that ultimately signifies nothing because, after the din dies down and the
actors leave the stage, corruption abides” (Wedeman, 2005, 94).
China’s strategy of ‘enforcement swamping’, relying on intensive periodic campaigns
targeted at cracking down some big fish was credited by some as being successful in the
sense that it helped to push corruption rates back below the ‘tipping point’ beyond which
further increases would have overwhelmed the regime’s enforcement resources and led to a
‘crisis of corruption’ (Manion, 1999). It was suggested that such a strategy was necessitated
by the lack of enforcement resources and capacity (including policy capacity) to wipe out
corruption. Campaign enforcement involves the consequential steps of increasing the
intensity of internal monitoring, then increasing prosecutorial efficiency, then changing the
incentive structure by offering ‘clemency’ to those who surrender, and finally mobilizing
extra-judicial monitoring mechanisms, including the masses. Whether used in a randomized
or reactionary manner, the primary function of campaign-style enforcement is more to
control corruption than to eradicate it, irrespective of the rhetoric accompanying such
campaigns (Wedeman, 2005, 98). It worked through a process of changing the calculus of
cadres and their incentive structures by temporarily increasing their risk of being caught
and the severity of punishment, and by creating uncertainty about the future risk of
detection (ibid).
The short term goal is to reduce the rate of corruption by capturing corrupt officials, so that
in the long term, there is deterrence effect because lowering the rate of corruption will
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enhance the efficacy of routine policing by improving the balance between enforcement
capabilities and the rate of corruption. However, given this kind of ‘kitten-and-mice’
strategy, it would also mean that corruption is not meant to be eradicated entirely because
there does not exist a policy of ‘zero tolerance’. Campaign enforcement may also lay the
seeds  for  more  high-level  corruption  -  so  long  as  routine  detection  rates  remain  relatively
low and only soar up during periods of hyper-enforcement (i.e. during campaign periods),
campaigns are likely to deter low-level corruption but not high-stakes high-level corruption.
Cadres engaged in high-stakes corruption will have stronger incentives to sit tight than
those engaged in petty corruption. By deterring low-level and petty corruption without
deterring high-stakes high-level corruption – and perhaps even contributing to high-stakes
corruption by encouraging corrupt cadres to demand bigger bribes – campaign enforcement
might have by default actually caused the subsequent intensification of corruption
(Wedeman, 2005, 114-115). Tentative comparative data analysis also suggests that there
has  been  a  significant  decrease  in  the  odds  that  corrupt  officials  will  get  caught  over  the
past decade, thus widening the gap between actual rate of corruption and reported rate of
corruption (Wedeman, 2007).
Although its rhetoric still resembles that of mass movements, Sapio (2005) contends that
the anti-corruption strategy nowadays consists of a far more complex set of measures
marking a clear departure from the past style of enforcement, as exemplified by the
multiple legal and administrative measures introduced in recent years. Instead of ad hoc
campaigns, there is now growing institutionalization of a three-pronged policy where
preventive measures are taken alongside repressive and propagandistic ones, underpinned
by improved legal foundations and better-trained legal personnel (Sapio 2005, 4). However,
selective implementation is still discernible in three aspects: selective sanction, i.e. letting
the party deal with corruption crimes using ‘organizational measures’ (zuzhi chuli) rather
than disciplinary or criminal sanctions; selective prosecution, i.e. graft and passive bribery
being more likely prosecuted than active bribery and misappropriations of public funds; and
selective sentencing, i.e. the inconsistency of sentencing by the courts (ibid, 40-41). Such
selectivity could be explained by local protectionism and the broad and unchecked
regulatory powers enjoyed by local anti-corruption organs, resulting in eschewing the
implementation  of  anti-corruption  laws  enacted  by  the  centre,  and  tolerating  illegal
practices seen as promoting short-term local economic interests:
“Acts of misappropriation are aimed at different purposes. Notwithstanding the
absolutely negative impact sorted by corruption on long term economic growth,
misappropriation can often result in a boost of local growth, albeit one standing on
shaking foundations….
Active bribery can sort the same effect. Starting from the nineties bribery has been
employed to get  access  to  resources needed to fulfill  the plans for  local  economic
growth….” (Sapio, 2005, 37-38).
In other words, the developmental priorities of local party bosses and their concern for local
economic and revenue growth, in light of the new emphasis on local achievements as
judged by hard data, are at least partly responsible for the institutionalization of economic
rent-seeking in the form of corrupt practices. Another problem is the existence of
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corruption even within anti-corruption agencies, including the procuratorate and the courts.
For example, a total of 144 provincial-level anti-corruption officials were dismissed and
expelled from the party in 2004 (Guang, 2005). In June 2004, Han Jianlin, Director of the
Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Jiangsu Provincial Procuratorate, was dismissed because of
corruption charges (Sina net, 19 June, 2004). As Manion (2004, 201) observed, “in a setting
of widespread corruption, corrupt enforcers and a shortage of enforcement resources,
relative to the scope of the problem, pose significant obstacles”.
Conceptualizing corruption: From a crisis of the system to the production of legitimacy
The rampant situation of corruption within the context of rapid economic reform and social
transformation has triggered two opposing calls for rectification: the traditionalist or
socialist-conservative tendency blames the market as the source of all evils and urges more
government control and regulation; whereas the liberal-reformist tendency blames the
government (and hence the power of officials) as the source of evil and advocates full-
fledged marketization and the withdrawal of state interference. To the latter, alluding to
Huntington’s theory of modernization (Huntington, 1967; 1970), corruption is sometimes
functionally unavoidable given the existing structural constraints of a government
controlled and interfered market. The claims and counterclaims are illustrated in Table 2.
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? Structural causes as indirect or external,
motivational factors as direct and
fundamental
? Corruption as caused by market reforms.
While market economy can raise
efficiency, it also leads to money
fetishism by sanctioning monetary value
and self-interest as highest goals.
Corruption results when individuals
commercialize all human transactions.
? Structural causes as fundamental
? Corruption only a byproduct of
market reforms; it is an incomplete
and obstructed market, rather than
the market per se, that is the real
culprit.
? Roots of corruption lie in the
intervention and destruction of
economic activities by




? Corruption shakes public confidence in
the government and party, damages their
legitimacy and provides pretext for
‘bourgeois liberals’ to incite anti-
government sentiments
? Corruption casts doubts on the
future of reform and prevents
market from functioning properly
? Economic development is top
priority and some irregular




? Eradicating corruption requires
reconsidering and halting market reforms
? State and ideological control needs to be
strengthened, not weakened
? Retreat of government from the
economy
? More genuine market reforms
necessary
Source: Sun (2001).
As Sun (2001) remarked, the two forces appear more or less equally matched, at both the
political and intellectual levels. Such contestation in the corruption discourse is expected to
persist as the economic, social and political transition of China deepens. Whether one takes
the conservative or liberal view, corruption would still seem to stay as a permanent feature
because on the one hand, as there is no prospect of the existing one-party state system
coming to an end soon, state power would continue to be politically unchecked, thus
restraining market autonomy and encouraging bureaucratic rent-seeking (the structural
cause of corruption in the eyes of the liberals); while on the other hand, with the party-state
being unlikely to put a brake on market reforms, the opportunities for corruption caused by
the re-interfacing of bureaucracy and market would remain abundant. The deepening of
reform may ironically contribute to further intensification of corruption by progressively
reducing the structural opportunities for low-level corruption while creating new
opportunities for the high-level high-stakes corruption (Gong, 1997; He, 2000).
While it may be true that corruption will persist as a major social and political problem to
China in the foreseeable future, the party leadership’s latest response to it has seen a
strategic shift, in turning it around to become a political narrative that helps shore up the
legitimacy of the state. As Hsu (2001) explained, in the 1980s, political critics, dissidents
and disgruntled intellectuals all drew upon the traditionalist collective narrative of
corruption to blame the leadership and the political system for various social problems, and
in so doing threatened the political authority of the party-state (as happened in the
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Tiananmen protests of 1989). Since the 1990s, however, party leaders and the official
media  had  revised  the  story  of  corruption  so  that  it  was  no  longer  a  sign  of  government
failure, but that of the party-state fighting corruption on behalf of its people in order to
bring them economic opportunities, better living standards and social stability. Corruption,
as public enemy number one, is now blamed by the state for harming economic
development by “debilitating the party-state’s ability to implement its policies of economic
construction, economic reform, and ‘opening up’ to the outside world” (Hsu 2001, 44).
In re-articulating the narrative of corruption, the state turns around the traditional narrative
as promoted by dissidents that interpreted corruption as a sign of an incompetent and
immoral regime; instead, the economic management narrative translated anti-corruption
into the symbol of the state’s efforts to improve economic development. As Hsu saw it, the
new narrative succeeded not only in co-opting the issue of corruption, but also in becoming
a commonly borrowed collective narrative that was used even by the critics (Hsu 2001, 46).
It  may  also  be  added  that  within  the  factional  power  politics  of  the  CCP,  corruption
sometimes provides a convenient premise for removing political rivals or insubordinate
senior cadres by exposing their corruption crimes even though the motive for action against
them is essentially a political one. The removal of former Beijing municipal party chief
Chen Xitong by ex-party General Secretary Jiang Zemin in 1995 (Wedeman, 1996), and the
latest removal of former Shanghai municipal party chief Chen Liangyu by current party
General Secretary Hu Jintao, both on corruption charges, are widely seen as political moves
to  foil  a  major  challenge  by  a  powerful  local  party  boss  to  the  consolidation  of  the  new
party leadership’s authority at the centre.
CAN CHINA LEARN FROM HONG KONG?
In terms of both enforcement and the political strategy to achieve legitimacy, the Chinese
leadership can learn from Hong Kong’s past anti-corruption initiative. Mainland China
today is similar to colonial Hong Kong in the 1970s: corruption becoming rampant and
somewhat institutionalized; the government suffering from a serious legitimacy crisis; and
there being no opportunity to have more fundamental constitutional reform in order to re-
legitimize government politically, but every possibility for the leadership to seize upon the
window of opportunity induced by the crisis of corruption to launch a ‘silent revolution’ to
regain some degree of political trust and legitimacy. Using Kingdon (1984)’s model, both
the ‘problem’ and the ‘politics’ are present, even the ‘policy’ may be around if the Hong
Kong anti-corruption approach could be adopted to bring about effectiveness (which seems
plausible given that the new National Corruption Prevention Bureau is clearly modeled on
Hong Kong’s ICAC).
Quah identifies three distinct patterns of corruption control (Quah, 2003, 16-17): Pattern 1
occurs when there are anti-corruption laws but no specific agency to implement these laws.
Pattern 2 involves the combination of anti-corruption laws and several anti-corruption
agencies. Pattern 3 involves the impartial implementation of comprehensive anti-corruption
laws by a specific anti-corruption agency. Singapore and Hong Kong, both world-
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acclaimed to be highly successful in keeping a clean government and clean society through
vigorous corruption control efforts, belong to pattern 3. Mainland China is an example of
pattern 2. The question is: Can China learn from Hong Kong and move from pattern 2 to
pattern 3?  Based on his comparative study of four Asian societies (Singapore, Hong Kong,
Thailand and South Korea), Quah (in this issue) further sets out six pre-conditions for the
effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency (ACA):
1. The ACA must be incorruptible;
2. The ACA must be independent from the police and from political control;
3. There must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation;
4. The ACA must have adequate staff and funding;
5. The ACA must enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially; and
6. Political will is crucial for minimizing corruption.
The related question is: Can China’s ACAs satisfy these pre-conditions, or are these pre-
conditions critical to anti-corruption effectiveness in China?
Enforcement model – Multi-agency structure to remain
There is no doubt that during recent years, there have been increasing voices among policy
advisers and researchers urging the Chinese government to move in a single-agency
direction. For example, Hu Angang, director of Tsinghua University’s China Studies
Research Centre, has been advocating the enactment of an Anti-Corruption Law9 and the
establishment  of  a  Central  Anti-Corruption  Authority  (by  amalgamating  the  Major  Cases
Unit of the CCDI and the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate),
as part of the new third-generation anticorruption strategy of the Hu-Wen leadership (as
contrasted with the Deng and Jiang strategies). Recent anti-corruption emphasis has also
certainly pointed to the move towards a three-pronged approach similar to the Hong Kong
ICAC model in fighting corruption on the three fronts of enforcement, prevention and
education. The latest Implementation Outline adopted in January 2005 underscores such an
approach. Addressing an international corruption studies course organized by the
University of Hong Kong in November 2006, a Vice-Director of the Ministry of
Supervision, Guo Hongliang, made it quite clear that Hong Kong was a role model for the
mainland in its anticorruption offensive: “Hong Kong is such a good example in its fight
against bribery” (South China Morning Post, 7 November 2006). Modeling on ICAC’s
three-pronged strategy, however, is not necessarily the same as adopting its single-ACA
approach.  On  the  contrary,  as  the  latest  launch  of  the  National  Corruption  Prevention
Bureau indicates, China is to stay put with a three-agency approach – meaning CCDI (as
the party anti-corruption organ), Ministry of Supervision (that acts concurrently through the
NCPB), and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (and its Anti-Corruption Bureau). All of
these agencies have investigative powers and sometimes operate jointly as special ‘work
teams’ on big cases.
9 In the mid-1990s, there was a great debate about enacting an anti-corruption law. Disagreements in the NPC
on a draft anti-corruption bill forced it to be withdrawn from voting. One key area of contention was the bill’s
scope. Eventually the Law on Administrative Supervision was passed in May 1997 instead (Sun, 2001, 251).
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Hong Kong (and also Singapore) is the pioneer of the single-agency approach to fight
corruption. Compared with the multiple-agency approach used in other countries, this is
more ambitious in that while creating a super-powerful ‘lead’ organization, it may also pose
a higher power risk by possibly upsetting the balance and separation of governmental
powers. The organizational politics of the Chinese system have to be taken into
consideration in any process of transplanting the Hong Kong experience. In both Hong
Kong and Singapore, the single-agency option was chosen because there was a crisis of
legitimacy that threatened investor confidence and political stability (Meagher, 2005).
Normally anti-corruption agencies need to be strategic in defining their focus because an
unlimited mandate might well jeopardize its effectiveness. Hong Kong’s ICAC is arguably
the exception in that it is given a very broad anti-corruption jurisdiction over both the
public  and  private  sectors,  in  effect  covering  the  whole  of  society,  coupled  with  a  ‘zero-
tolerance’  mission.  This  kind  of  comprehensive  model  that  seeks  to  eradicate  rather  than
merely controlling corruption would be a far cry from the current situation in mainland
China where selective enforcement and a multi-agency (involving party and state organs,
with decentralizing of investigation and prosecution powers to local agencies) approach
would still prevail, not to mention the fact that local economic protectionism often
condones or even encourages bribery, misappropriations and others corrupt practices.
A related question is whether in the current political system of China, it is possible to
establish a single ACA that stands even above party organs, and is accountable,
independent, mandated with high power (both legislatively and administratively), and given
reassurance of staff and budget resources. In practice, ACAs work not just on their own, but
have to rely on the availability of adequate laws and procedures, and a proper system of the
rule of law – accompanied by functional courts, free and active media, an energetic
community of NGOs and public interest groups, and other capable agencies of restraint
such as the supreme audit and central bank (Meagher, 2005, 98). As China stands presently,
it is desperately in need of such institutional mechanisms to create and sustain a habitat
conducive  to  strong  actions  against  corruption.  In  other  words,  anti-corruption  is  a  key  to
more extensive reforms to the system of governance, but administrative and governance
reforms in other aspects also need to be launched at the same time in order to give well-
designed anti-corruption measures a conducive environment to bear fruit and become
effective. As previous discussion shows, corruption within ACAs is a serious problem in
China. In addition, ACAs in China cannot be free of political control within the party-state
configuration. Since 1993, the Ministry of Supervision has in effect been operating
alongside the CCDI under the so-called ‘one working team, two organizational labels’
model, a phenomenon also common in other function areas. A more optimistic view might
be  that  given  the  overriding  power  of  CCDI,  which  in  effect  leads  other  ACAs,  a quasi-
single-agency model is already in place by default.
However, the effectiveness of the party’s own anti-corruption apparatus can be
circumscribed. The ‘dual leadership’ system which local Disciplinary Inspection
Committees  work  under  –  they  are  led  vertically  by  CCDI and horizontally by the
corresponding local party committee – can often frustrate anti-corruption investigations.
Political interference, especially at the local levels, remains a major obstacle to anti-
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corruption  work.  As  Gong  (2006)  points  out,  the  local  party  boss  who  has  great  control
over resources and personnel as a result of power decentralization from the centre to
various local levels, can easily become free from effective institutional oversight and
disciplinary surveillance (dubbed the ‘number one person phenomenon’, diyibashou
xianxiang). Party and state regulations relating to corruption remain quite scattered and a
comprehensive anti-corruption law has yet to be enacted. Hence the overall ACA structure
does not meet all of the pre-conditions found to be essential by Quah for effectiveness.
Having said that, the fact that China remains a country tightly run by a party-state means
that if the party leadership decides to take strong action against corrupt activities, its
organizational capability is still a force to be reckoned with.
The politics of corruption
It is generally believed that Hong Kong and Singapore were highly successful in
eliminating widespread entrenched corruption at a time of accelerating economic takeoff
three decades ago because the top officials in government undertook a dramatic – and
credible – programme of suppressing corruption (Meagher, 2005, 99). Anti-corruption
efforts are unavoidably political. The causes and consequences of corruption, as well as the
solutions for it, tend to be intertwined (Jain, 2001, 72).  Should the political elites be
corrupted, they would likely attempt to reduce the effectiveness of the legal and judicial
systems through the manipulation of resource allocation and appointments, which in turn
would weaken the effectiveness of the system to combat corruption. On the other hand, the
politics  of  corruption  also  shows  that  the  leadership’s  self-preservation  could  be  a  strong
motivating force behind anti-corruption cleanups (Gillespie and Okrunhlik, 1991).
Meagher’s (2005, 88) review of the emergence of ACAs suggested that the ‘constitutional
moment’  of  their  establishment  was  critically  important,  i.e.  by  capturing  the  momentum
created by scandal and crisis, gaining consensus on a reasonably clear and realistic strategy,
and mobilizing the resources to implement it. During the post-1967 crisis of legitimacy in
Hong Kong, by building up strong public expectations for combating corruption, and
seizing the opportunity of an administration that was weakened by the crisis and thus
internally less resistant to drastic reforms, MacLehose was able to accomplish what
previously was thought almost impossible, either because of a lack in political will or the
difficulty to secure intra-governmental consensus.
In  today’s  China,  corruption  is  clearly  seen  as  a  major  crisis  that  hurts  the  political
leadership in addition to the well-being of the ordinary citizens. The economic management
narrative of corruption, though partly an attempt to snatch the corruption agenda from the
critics and political dissidents by the party-state, also underscores the perceived long-term
threat of corruption to the new leadership’s mission to restore a harmonious society and
regain political trust and legitimacy. The incumbent leadership clearly has the self-
preservation motive. Regardless of the innovation in terminology and language employed
in the current anti-corruption and governance reform campaigns – such as enhancing the
democratic rule of the party, higher transparency, respect for the law, enhancing the
governance capability of the party, institutional building of a corruption-free government,
and so on – its ultimate goal is to curb corruption in the party and government in order to
improve the quality of governance by the party-state, and thereby to reinvent the legitimacy
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of CCP rule in China against mounting internal discontent and international pressures and
threats to the ‘socialist’ regime10.
The present anti-corruption offensive should not be read as just another round of
spontaneous or ad hoc responses, but may be placed at the core of a reinvention agenda to
be unveiled at the 17th Party Congress scheduled for late 2007. Indeed, the massive efforts
in researching and planning anti-corruption work during recent years had come along with
the 16th CCP Party Congress in 2002. They are part of a ‘regime saving’ project, mingled
by political struggles and power consolidation means in 2005-06, after the Hu-Wen strategy
had faced challenges from different fronts, ranging from the so-called ‘Shanghai circle’, the
emerging upper-middle class, to the giant domestic interests and the ‘New Left’ faction (i.e.
the ‘reform or not to reform’ controversy) 11 .  The  complexity  of  the  present  situation
somewhat resembles that of the former British colonial government desperate to improve
itself to maintain its rule in a developing and more educated Hong Kong in the 1970s, and a
number of parallels in terms of problem, policy and politics (a la Kingdon, 1984) can be
drawn  (Table  3). This may well present a window of political opportunity for China to
move into a steady and enhanced anti-corruption path in the years to come.
10 In response to internal demands and external pressures for democratic reforms, the State Council published
a White Paper on democracy in China in October 2005, which reflected current party leadership thinking (The
State Council, People’s Republic of China, 2005).
11 The  author  thanks  Siu  Hoi-yin,  who  visited  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Social  Sciences  in  2005-06,  for
providing this perspective based on her own research on corruption in China and her interviews with some
senior academics and officials in Beijing.
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Table 3. Comparing present-day China with colonial Hong Kong in 1970s in anti-
corruption efforts using Kingdon’s model
China (now) Hong Kong (1970s)
Problem ? Corruption becoming rampant and
institutionalized hurting credibility
of both party-state and economic
reforms
? Corruption as officially-defined
‘problem’ helping to underscore
regime’s determination to improve
economy and people’s livelihood –
the economic management
narrative
? Syndicated corruption becoming
dysfunctional to both economic
development and modernization of
government to cope with new
challenges
? Corruption as officially-defined




Policy ? Implementation Outline (2005)
marked new three-pronged
approach (education, institution-
building, and supervision &
monitoring) emphasizing both
punitive and prevention actions
? Debate over need to move to
single-agency approach




Politics ? Hu-Wen leadership seeking to
promote party and government
reforms without questioning CCP
rule in China
? Anticorruption can be means to
improve quality of public sector
and regain people’s trust and
political legitimacy for the party
? MacLehose seized on political
opportunity in early 1970s to use
anticorruption as means to
underscore government reforms and
to gain political trust and legitimacy,




To conclude, so long as there is the perceived threat to the leadership’s political security
(i.e. a corruption-induced crisis), there should be a correspondingly strong political will to
take mitigating or remedial action. The Hu-Wen leadership may have its own political
motives and agenda (such as strengthening CCP rule), just as MacLehose had his own in
colonial Hong Kong, but if such politically-motivated strategy could be aligned with the
general population’s strong resentment towards widespread corruption and its rising
expectations for some clear-cut actions against corruption, then there is the possibility that a
new consensus can be achieved that is conducive to a more comprehensive and sustainable
anti-corruption strategy. China may not follow exactly the path of Hong Kong and
Singapore, in terms of shifting towards a single-ACA approach, and its anti-corruption
drive will remain shaped by political factors and institutional constraints as discussed in
this article, but this should not mean that the country is not able to make some good
progress in fighting corruption and plugging some institutional loopholes. It is clear, though,
International Public Management Review  ?  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net
Volume 8 Issue 2  ?  2007  ?  © International Public Management Network
67
that combating corruption involves not just the ACA front, but more wide-ranging efforts
in institutional and governance reforms.
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